



SSE-LAB 1: Security Requirements

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Agenda

- Brief conceptual review
- Practical case
- Elicitation of security goals
- Elicitation of security requirements
- Elaboration of Misuse and Abuse Cases
- Instantiation of security specification patterns (KAOS)





Security Goals & Requirements



How can we write security requirements?





Security Goals & Requirements

There is no good answer to that question!

- It means evolving from "art" to engineering...
- No particular methodology has yet achieved dominance.
- We will follow a **lightweight process**.







I - Preliminaries (functional requirements)

Before starting to outline security requirements we need to identify what the system is and does:

- SECURITY = "the system does what it's supposed to do and nothing more!"
- Hence, we first need to extract the system's functional requirements from its specification.

<u>User stories</u> are short descriptions of software features written from the perspective of the end user:

• They can help us identifying the **assets** of a system.

Assets are things or entities of great value that must be properly secured.





I - Preliminaries (functional requirements)

<u>Remember</u>: Functional requirements must be **testable**

- It should be possible to determine whether the system satisfies the requirement or not.
- ✓ Security requirements should be <u>testable</u> as well.

Case study: The "Metaverse"

Lab tasks (I):

- Read the case study description.
- Create and discuss user stories.
- Use the following pattern as a guide:



As a <user> I can perform <action>, so that <purpose>

Example: example goes here





II - Security Goals (Harm analysis)

The goal of system security is to protect assets from harms.

- Harms occur when an action adversely affects the value of an asset.
- Harms are usually related to some of the CIA+ security concerns:
 - CONFIDENTIALITY
 - INTEGRITY
 - AVAILABILITY
 - ACCESS-CONTROL
 - NON-REDUPIATION

Security goals can be extracted though a harm analysis.

- 1. <u>Identify concerns</u> as triples of the form {action, asset, harm}
 - "What harm could come to [<mark>asset</mark>] from an action violating [<mark>concern</mark>]?"
- 2. <u>Derive security goals</u> by negating the concerns \rightarrow "AVOID" GOALS





II - Security Goals (Harm analysis)

Security goals can be found within **organization-wide policies**:

- ✓ Generated by applying the <u>management principles</u> to the assets and business goals of the system.
- ✓ Apply globally throughout an organization.

The result is a collection of "ACHIEVE" GOALS such as "achieve separation of duties when paying invoices" or "audit all uses of account information".

Lab Tasks (II):

- Identify the assets from the user stories
- Conduct a harm analysis
- Identify "avoid' goals.
- Identify "achieve" goals.







III - Security Requirements (Threat analysis)

- Perform a threat analysis to discover threats T_i, here T_i is a malicious action that <u>causes the harm</u> mentioned in the security goal.
- SR_i = ¬T_i → Security requirements are the <u>negation</u> ("avoid") of the identified threats.

Harm refers to the impact \Rightarrow **Attacker-neutral** (mostly).

Threat refers to the causes \Rightarrow **Attacker-based** (e.g., insider or outsider)

⇒ <u>Misuse cases</u>: A way of performing threat analysis by **anticipating abnormal behavior** and deriving security requirements.

Lab Tasks (III):

- Identify potential attackers of the system under analysis (*Metaverse*).
- Elaborate the misuse cases and extract security requirements.





IV - Security Specification Patterns

Goal Avoid [SensitiveInfoKnownByUnauthorizedAgent] FormalSpec ∀ ag: Agent, ob: Object ¬ Authorized (ag, ob.Info) ⇒ ¬ KnowsV_{ag} (ob.Info)

Goal Maintain [PrivateInfoKnownOnlyIfAuthorizedByOwner]


FormalSpec ∀ ag, ag': Agent, ob: Object

KnowsV_{ag} (ob.Info) \land OwnedBy (ob.Info, ag') \land ag \neq ag'

 \Rightarrow AuthorizedBy (ag, ob.Info, ag')

Goal Maintain [ObjectInfoChangeOnlyIfCorrectAndAuthorized] **FormalSpec** \forall ag: Agent, ob: Object, v : Value ob.Info = v \land o (ob.Info \neq v) \land UnderControl (ob.Info, ag) \Rightarrow Authorized (ag, ob.Info) \land o Integrity (ob.Info)

Goal Achieve [ObjectInfoUsableWhenNeededAndAuthorized]
FormalSpec ∀ ag: Agent, ob: Object, v : Value
Needs (ag, ob.Info) ∧ Authorized (ag, ob.Info)
⇒ ◊_{≤d} Using (ag, ob.Info)







IV - Security Specification Patterns

Notes:

- "P⇒ Q" means " (P→ Q)" where the temporal operator " " means "in every future state" and "→" denotes logical implication.
- "o" means "in the next state".
- "◊≤d" means "some time in the future within d time units".

Lab Tasks (IV):

- Compute security goals (SGs)
 - Instantiate the specification patterns.
- Compute the anti-goals (AGs).





Questions ?

