secure-software-engineering/Exercise/Writeup/lab01.md

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# Lab 1: Security Requirements
## Metaverse User Stories
`Metaverse Users` are referred to as users here.
User | Task | Goal | Context | Action | Outcomes
-- | -- | -- | -- | -- | --
User | perform authorized payment transactions | only I can make transactions in my name | An adversary knows my payment information | he tries to pay with my info | the payment is declined if not authorized by me
Developer | access user configurations (avatars, config) | personalize the user experience of my applications
Teacher | make physical course material available in the metaverse | students can see them in virtual reality
User | have a unique identification key in bound to my avatar | everyone can recognize my avatar | my avatar is public | my avatar is used by another user | the user cannot impersonate my identity because he doesn't know the key
User | virtual home to be self or zero knowledge hosted | my privacy can not be intruded
Corrections:
- User stories are more non-functional and should not contain less security aspects, rather the use-case functionality
User | Task | Goal
-- | -- | --
User | Perform a payment | Acquire a virtual/physical asset
User | Add and remove friends | Keep track of what my friends are up to
User | Set home privacy | Prevent strangers from entering my home
User | Use voice chat | Communicate with other users
User | Fast travel | Quickly get to another location in the virtual space
User | Give another user an item | Sell/Gift assets
> As a 'Metaverse user',
> I want to add/remove friends (from/to my virtual friend list)
> So I can keep track of their activites
**Integrity** => Befriending strangers => disclosing personal information to strangers (HARM)
**ACTION** => Unauthorized access (edit) to FList
## Assets
- User identity
- User belongings
- Friends lists
- Public image of system
- Voice data
### Harm analysis
> "What **HARM** could come to [asset] from an [action] violating a [concern]?"
> assets from User Stories
> actions yield Avoid goals
> concerns from CIA+ principles
Action | Asset | Harm
-- | -- | --
Steal user credentials | User identity | User information compromised, belongings stolen
Accept unwanted friend request | Friends lists | User information partially compromised, trust acquired
Unmute user microphone without consent | Voice data | User privacy compromised
### *'Achieve'* goals
- Always use multi-factor authentication for users
## Use Cases
Produced using [Lucidchart](https://lucid.app/lucidchart/daccac87-861b-46f9-a0f1-5d13ae90bc02/edit?invitationId=inv_6aea8472-a917-4a59-ad01-afd8f3ca40e5).
![Use Case / Misuse Case diagram](MisuseCase.svg)